Abstract
In this paper we characterize a value, called a marginalistic value, for monotonie set games, which can be considered to be the analog of the Shapley value for TU-games. For this characterization we use a modification of the strong monotonicity axiom of Young, but the proof is rather different from his.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 97-111 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Volume | 26 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 1997 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Cooperative game
- Marginal contribution
- Monotonicity
- Set game
- Shapley value
- Value
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Statistics and Probability
- Mathematics (miscellaneous)
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty