A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls

Yu Zhou

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.012

A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls

Yu Zhou

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We extend the multi-item auction model of Talman and Yang (2008) and Andersson et al. (2015) by considering both unit-demand bidders with budget constraints and price controls on bidding items. Due to these budget and price restrictions, a Walrasian equilibrium generally fails to exist. To achieve efficiency, we propose a rationed equilibrium whose allocation is in the core. We also construct an ascending auction to find the proposed rationed equilibrium in (pseudo-)polynomial time.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	76-79
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	155
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.012
Publication status	Published - 2017 Jun 1
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Budget constraints
Core allocation
Multi-item auction
Price controls
Rationed equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2017.03.012

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abstract = "We extend the multi-item auction model of Talman and Yang (2008) and Andersson et al. (2015) by considering both unit-demand bidders with budget constraints and price controls on bidding items. Due to these budget and price restrictions, a Walrasian equilibrium generally fails to exist. To achieve efficiency, we propose a rationed equilibrium whose allocation is in the core. We also construct an ascending auction to find the proposed rationed equilibrium in (pseudo-)polynomial time.",

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AB - We extend the multi-item auction model of Talman and Yang (2008) and Andersson et al. (2015) by considering both unit-demand bidders with budget constraints and price controls on bidding items. Due to these budget and price restrictions, a Walrasian equilibrium generally fails to exist. To achieve efficiency, we propose a rationed equilibrium whose allocation is in the core. We also construct an ascending auction to find the proposed rationed equilibrium in (pseudo-)polynomial time.

KW - Budget constraints

KW - Core allocation

KW - Multi-item auction

KW - Price controls

KW - Rationed equilibrium

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JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

A multi-item auction with budget-constrained bidders and price controls

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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