Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a new basis of the set of all TU games. Shapley (1953) introduced the unanimity game in which cooperation of all players in a given coalition yields payoff. We introduce the commander game in which only one player in a given coalition yields payoff. The set of the commander games forms a basis and has two properties. First, when we express a game by a linear combination of the basis, the coefficients related to singletons coincide with the Shapley value. Second, the basis induces the null space of the Shapley value.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 21-24 |
Number of pages | 4 |
Journal | Mathematical social sciences |
Volume | 80 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2016 Mar 1 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- General Social Sciences
- General Psychology
- Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty