A security pattern for data integrity in P2P systems

Benjamin Schleinzer, Nobukazu Yoshioka

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


Peer-To-Peer-systems (P2P) introduced new methods to distribute large amounts of data to end users. To increase the distribution speed resources from all participating network nodes, the peers, are used, and therefore the workload on own resources decreases. To utilize all peers large data is split into small pieces, so called chunks, and these chunks are distributed among peers therefore making each chunk available on different peers. To identify and find chunks in P2P-systems hash algorithms are used, and each peer is responsible for a specific range of the hash's keyspace and all chunks that fall within this keyspace. With data stored on multiple peers new security risks in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability arise. Our security pattern targeted specifically for P2P-systems helps system designers to identify possible threats and show appropriate countermeasures. We show how secure hash algorithms can guarantee the integrity of the distributed data even though chunks are sent to, received from, and stored by multiple, possible untrustworthy, peers.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationPLoP 2010 - 17th Conference on Pattern Languages of Programs, Proceedings
Publication statusPublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event17th Conference on Pattern Languages of Programs, PLoP 2010 - Reno, NV, United States
Duration: 2010 Oct 162010 Oct 18

Publication series

NameACM International Conference Proceeding Series


Conference17th Conference on Pattern Languages of Programs, PLoP 2010
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityReno, NV

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Human-Computer Interaction
  • Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition
  • Computer Networks and Communications


Dive into the research topics of 'A security pattern for data integrity in P2P systems'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this