AES key recovery based on Switching Distance model

Hongying Liu; Guoyu Qian; Satoshi Goto; Yukiyasu Tsunoo

doi:10.1109/ISECS.2010.55

AES key recovery based on Switching Distance model

Hongying Liu^*, Guoyu Qian, Satoshi Goto, Yukiyasu Tsunoo

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

As one of the effective side-channel attacks that threaten the security of cryptographic devices, Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks exploit the linear relation between the known power consumption and the predicted power consumption of cryptographic devices to recover keys. A robust cryptographic algorithm should endure both the cryptanalysis from software and hardware implementations. Researches have focused on the security examination of AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). In this paper, we present the CPA attack with the Switching Distance model against an AES implementation on ASIC. Compared with the leakage model of Hamming Distance, the power traces of recovering keys have been decreased by as much as 25%. These should cause more attention of security experts.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010
Pages	218-222
Number of pages	5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/ISECS.2010.55
Publication status	Published - 2010
Event	3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010 - Guangzhou Duration: 2010 Jul 29 → 2010 Jul 31

Other

Other	3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010
City	Guangzhou
Period	10/7/29 → 10/7/31

Keywords

AES
CPA
Hamming Distance
Side-channel attacks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Management of Technology and Innovation
Marketing

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10.1109/ISECS.2010.55

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@inproceedings{6437cc4bd5864fcdb63bde60eab75dc1,

title = "AES key recovery based on Switching Distance model",

abstract = "As one of the effective side-channel attacks that threaten the security of cryptographic devices, Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks exploit the linear relation between the known power consumption and the predicted power consumption of cryptographic devices to recover keys. A robust cryptographic algorithm should endure both the cryptanalysis from software and hardware implementations. Researches have focused on the security examination of AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). In this paper, we present the CPA attack with the Switching Distance model against an AES implementation on ASIC. Compared with the leakage model of Hamming Distance, the power traces of recovering keys have been decreased by as much as 25%. These should cause more attention of security experts.",

keywords = "AES, CPA, Hamming Distance, Side-channel attacks",

author = "Hongying Liu and Guoyu Qian and Satoshi Goto and Yukiyasu Tsunoo",

year = "2010",

doi = "10.1109/ISECS.2010.55",

language = "English",

pages = "218--222",

booktitle = "3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010",

note = "3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010 ; Conference date: 29-07-2010 Through 31-07-2010",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - AES key recovery based on Switching Distance model

AU - Liu, Hongying

AU - Qian, Guoyu

AU - Goto, Satoshi

AU - Tsunoo, Yukiyasu

PY - 2010

Y1 - 2010

N2 - As one of the effective side-channel attacks that threaten the security of cryptographic devices, Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks exploit the linear relation between the known power consumption and the predicted power consumption of cryptographic devices to recover keys. A robust cryptographic algorithm should endure both the cryptanalysis from software and hardware implementations. Researches have focused on the security examination of AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). In this paper, we present the CPA attack with the Switching Distance model against an AES implementation on ASIC. Compared with the leakage model of Hamming Distance, the power traces of recovering keys have been decreased by as much as 25%. These should cause more attention of security experts.

AB - As one of the effective side-channel attacks that threaten the security of cryptographic devices, Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks exploit the linear relation between the known power consumption and the predicted power consumption of cryptographic devices to recover keys. A robust cryptographic algorithm should endure both the cryptanalysis from software and hardware implementations. Researches have focused on the security examination of AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). In this paper, we present the CPA attack with the Switching Distance model against an AES implementation on ASIC. Compared with the leakage model of Hamming Distance, the power traces of recovering keys have been decreased by as much as 25%. These should cause more attention of security experts.

KW - AES

KW - CPA

KW - Hamming Distance

KW - Side-channel attacks

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U2 - 10.1109/ISECS.2010.55

DO - 10.1109/ISECS.2010.55

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:77957588621

SP - 218

EP - 222

BT - 3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010

T2 - 3rd International Symposium on Electronic Commerce and Security, ISECS 2010

Y2 - 29 July 2010 through 31 July 2010

ER -

AES key recovery based on Switching Distance model

Abstract

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Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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