(A)symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence

Yasushi Asako*, Yukihiko Funaki, Kozo Ueda, Nobuyuki Uto

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


Asymmetric information has explained the existence of a bubble in extant theoretical models. This study experimentally analyzes traders’ choices with and without asymmetric information based on the riding-bubble model. We show that traders tend to hold a bubble asset for longer, thereby expanding the bubble in a market with symmetric, rather than asymmetric, information. However, when traders are more experienced, the size of the bubble decreases, in which case bubbles do not arise with symmetric information. By contrast, the size of the bubble is stable in a market with asymmetric information.

Original languageEnglish
Article number103744
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics and Control
Publication statusPublished - 2020 Jan


  • Asymmetric information
  • Clock game
  • Crashes
  • Experiment
  • Riding bubbles

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Control and Optimization
  • Applied Mathematics


Dive into the research topics of '(A)symmetric information bubbles: Experimental evidence'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this