TY - JOUR
T1 - Axiomatic characterisations of the basic best–worst rule
AU - Kurihara, Takashi
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported by KAKENHI from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) , Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows, Japan [No. 17J02784 ], and Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Overseas Challenge Program for Young Researchers, Japan [No. 201780162 ]. The last two grants are related to an ERC project ACCORD (GA639945). I would like to express my gratitude to Waseda University, Japan for their financial support. I am grateful to Koichi Suga and Edith Elkind for their excellent and helpful comments and suggestions.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 Elsevier B.V.
PY - 2018/11
Y1 - 2018/11
N2 - We show that reinforcement and top–bottom cancellation imply anonymity, and that the basic best–worst rule can be characterised by neutrality, continuity, reinforcement, and top–bottom cancellation. Additionally, we directly characterise the basic best–worst rule by neutrality, reinforcement, top–bottom non-negativity, and top–bottom cancellation. Top–bottom non-negativity requires that if the difference in number between the individuals preferring a certain alternative as their best and worst alternatives respectively is strictly negative, then that alternative is not included in the social choice.
AB - We show that reinforcement and top–bottom cancellation imply anonymity, and that the basic best–worst rule can be characterised by neutrality, continuity, reinforcement, and top–bottom cancellation. Additionally, we directly characterise the basic best–worst rule by neutrality, reinforcement, top–bottom non-negativity, and top–bottom cancellation. Top–bottom non-negativity requires that if the difference in number between the individuals preferring a certain alternative as their best and worst alternatives respectively is strictly negative, then that alternative is not included in the social choice.
KW - Anonymity
KW - Best–worst
KW - Top–bottom non-negativity
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U2 - 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.08.013
DO - 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.08.013
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85051832659
SN - 0165-1765
VL - 172
SP - 19
EP - 22
JO - Economics Letters
JF - Economics Letters
ER -