Axiomatization of the core of assignment games

Manabu Toda*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)


The core of assignment games is characterized by two different lists of axioms. The first list consists of Pareto optimality, consistency, pairwise monotonicity, and individual monotonicity. The second list is obtained from the first one replacing the last axiom by population monotonicity. As a corollary, individual monotonicity and population monotonicity are equivalent under the other axioms. The core is also characterized by the second list on the restricted domain in which the worth of each pair is non-negative and every reservation value is zero.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)248-261
Number of pages14
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2005 Nov


  • Assignment games
  • Consistency
  • Core
  • Population monotonicity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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