Axiomatization of the core of assignment games

Manabu Toda

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.006

Axiomatization of the core of assignment games

Manabu Toda^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Social Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The core of assignment games is characterized by two different lists of axioms. The first list consists of Pareto optimality, consistency, pairwise monotonicity, and individual monotonicity. The second list is obtained from the first one replacing the last axiom by population monotonicity. As a corollary, individual monotonicity and population monotonicity are equivalent under the other axioms. The core is also characterized by the second list on the restricted domain in which the worth of each pair is non-negative and every reservation value is zero.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	248-261
Number of pages	14
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	53
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.006
Publication status	Published - 2005 Nov

Keywords

Assignment games
Consistency
Core
Population monotonicity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.006

Cite this

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abstract = "The core of assignment games is characterized by two different lists of axioms. The first list consists of Pareto optimality, consistency, pairwise monotonicity, and individual monotonicity. The second list is obtained from the first one replacing the last axiom by population monotonicity. As a corollary, individual monotonicity and population monotonicity are equivalent under the other axioms. The core is also characterized by the second list on the restricted domain in which the worth of each pair is non-negative and every reservation value is zero.",

keywords = "Assignment games, Consistency, Core, Population monotonicity",

author = "Manabu Toda",

note = "Funding Information: This research was supported by Waseda University Grant for Special Research Projects, #2000A-887, 21COE-GLOPE and Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research #15530125 from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports and Technology. The author thanks Hiroo Sasaki, Tomoichi Shinotsuka and William Thomson for encouragements and valuable comments. He is also grateful for helpful suggestions to the associate editor and anonymous referees, especially for pointing out errors in an earlier version, but he retains sole responsibility for any remaining errors.",

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KW - Consistency

KW - Core

KW - Population monotonicity

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Axiomatization of the core of assignment games

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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