Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games

René Van Den Brink*, Yukihiko Funaki

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

62 Citations (Scopus)


A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)303-340
Number of pages38
JournalTheory and Decision
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Sept

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Decision Sciences(all)
  • Developmental and Educational Psychology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Applied Psychology
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
  • Computer Science Applications


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