Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes

Ai Takeuchi, Róbert F. Veszteg*, Yoshio Kamijo, Yukihiko Funaki

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Using experimental data, we show that the characteristics of the joint production process have a notable impact on the distribution of bargaining agreements. The setting in which the jointly produced surplus is expressed to be proportional to individual inputs leads to significantly more proportional bargaining agreements. This is in contrast to the setting in which the surplus is expressed as an additive constant, where bargaining agreements are more in line with the Nash bargaining solution.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)169-198
Number of pages30
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume134
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2022 Jul

Keywords

  • Earned wealth
  • Laboratory experiment
  • Nash bargaining solution
  • Production function
  • Proportional solution
  • Unstructured bargaining

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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