Behavior strategies, mixed strategies and perfect recall

Mamoru Kaneko*, J. Jude Kline

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

21 Citations (Scopus)


When perfect recall is not satisfied, the informational contents of mixed and behavior strategies differ and are more than what the information partition describes. First, we consider two kinds of additional information strategies may carry, and show that such information leads to the perfect recall refinement of a given information partition. This does not, however, imply that the strategies compensate fully for the lack of perfect recall. We give a necessary and sufficient condition on an information partition, called A-loss, for the informational content of mixed strategies to fully compensate for the lack of perfect recall. The informational content of behavior strategies never fully compensates.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)127-145
Number of pages19
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1995 Jun
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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