TY - JOUR
T1 - Colonial Legacy and Foreign Aid
T2 - Decomposing the Colonial Bias
AU - Chiba, Daina
AU - Heinrich, Tobias
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful for comments from Navin Bapat, Sam Bell, Patrick Brandt, Rob Carroll, Mark Crescenzi, Matt DiGiuseppe, Brad Epperly, Chelsea Estancona, Yoshi Kobayashi, Amanda Licht, Pat Lown, Carla Martinez Machain, Tim Peterson, Lindsay Reid, Tom Scotto, Dan Tirone, and several anonymous re- viewers. Olivia Morris provided research assistance. Previous versions were presented at the IR workshop at the University of North Carolina (2014), the 4th Annual General Conference of The European Political Science Association (2014), the 2nd Annual Meeting of the Asian Political Methodology Conference (2015), and at Kansas State University (2017).
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, © 2019 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC.
PY - 2019/5/4
Y1 - 2019/5/4
N2 - It is well-known that donors give considerably more foreign aid to former colonies than to countries lacking past colonial ties. Unfortunately, we know relatively little about why this is the case. For one, there is almost never a theoretical justification for the inclusion of colonial history in statistical models. For the other, the only explicitly made rationale by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) actually predicts an interpretational problem: colonial history not only increases a former colony’s saliency to the donor, but also has left deep marks on recipients’ social and political institutions today. Both aspects shape how much aid a donor transfers to the recipient. This leaves ambiguous the meaning of the routinely found positive, sizable, and significant coefficient of colonial history on aid flows. We solve the inferential quandary by using a decomposition approach from labor econometrics. Our results show that about 75–100% of the colony effect on foreign aid stems from the greater saliency that donors give to policy concessions from former colonies.
AB - It is well-known that donors give considerably more foreign aid to former colonies than to countries lacking past colonial ties. Unfortunately, we know relatively little about why this is the case. For one, there is almost never a theoretical justification for the inclusion of colonial history in statistical models. For the other, the only explicitly made rationale by Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2009) actually predicts an interpretational problem: colonial history not only increases a former colony’s saliency to the donor, but also has left deep marks on recipients’ social and political institutions today. Both aspects shape how much aid a donor transfers to the recipient. This leaves ambiguous the meaning of the routinely found positive, sizable, and significant coefficient of colonial history on aid flows. We solve the inferential quandary by using a decomposition approach from labor econometrics. Our results show that about 75–100% of the colony effect on foreign aid stems from the greater saliency that donors give to policy concessions from former colonies.
KW - Development aid
KW - colonies
KW - foreign policy
KW - political economy
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U2 - 10.1080/03050629.2019.1593834
DO - 10.1080/03050629.2019.1593834
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85063959816
SN - 0305-0629
VL - 45
SP - 474
EP - 499
JO - International Interactions
JF - International Interactions
IS - 3
ER -