Conflict, interpersonal assessment, and the evolution of cooperation: Simulation results

James Hanley*, John Orbell, Tomonori Morikawa

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

6 Citations (Scopus)


How cooperative dispositions might have evolved among social animals has, for many years, been productively addressed within the prisoner's dilemma paradigm. That game captures the intuition that by cooperating, individuals can often produce more than is possible by their separate efforts and also that self-interest can lead individuals to undermine their cooperative efforts. The structure is robust, with only minor elaborations necessary to show how populations can realize their cooperative opportunities. The best-known such elaboration is iteration of the game; simply requiring players to interact in a sequence of prisoner's dilemmas can lead them to adopt cooperation-inducing strategies such as tit-for-tat (see, for example, Axelrod 1984; Nowak and Sigmund 1992) and winstay, lose-shift (Nowak and Sigmund 1993, see also Schuessler 1989 and Vanberg and Congleton 1992).

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationTrust and Reciprocity
Subtitle of host publicationInterdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research
PublisherRussell Sage Foundation
Number of pages37
ISBN (Electronic)9781610444347
ISBN (Print)9780871546470
Publication statusPublished - 2003 Jan 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)


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