Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems

Hiroo Sasaki*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

25 Citations (Scopus)


This paper presents axiomatic characterizations of the core of assignment problems. In the main axiomatization theorem we use six axioms including the consistency (CONS) and the weak pairwise-monotonicity (W.P.MON) which are firstly proposed and defined for this setup in the present paper. Since an assignment problem may be converted into a model of a private ownership economy with indivisible goods and the core of the assignment problem coincides with the set of the competitive allocations of the economy, our characterization theorems also give axiomatic characterizations of the set of competitive allocations. Because the consistency is a desirable property of resource allocation mechanisms, our main result gives a new normative implication of competitive equilibria.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)373-397
Number of pages25
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1995 Dec 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


Dive into the research topics of 'Consistency and monotonicity in assignment problems'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this