Consistency and the core in games with externalities

Takaaki Abe*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)


In the presence of externalities across coalitions, Dutta et al. (J Econ Theory 145:2380–2411, 2010) characterize their value by extending Hart and Mas-Colell reduced game consistency. In the present paper, we provide a characterization result for the core for games with externalities by extending one form of consistency studied by Moulin (J Econ Theory 36:120–148, 1985), which is often referred to as the complement-reduced game property. Moreover, we analyze another consistency formulated by Davis and Maschler (Naval Res Logist Quart 12:223–259, 1965), called the max-reduced game property and a final consistency called the projection-reduced game property. In environments with externalities, we discuss some asymmetric results among these different forms of reduced games.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)133-154
Number of pages22
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2018 Mar 1


  • Consistency
  • Core
  • Games with externalities
  • Reduced game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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