Contests with limited resources

Dmitriy Kvasov*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

73 Citations (Scopus)


Many interesting phenomena (electoral competition, R&D races, lobbying) are instances of multiple simultaneous contests with unconditional commitment of limited resources. Specifically, the following game is analyzed. Two players compete in a number of simultaneous contests. The players have limited resources (budgets) and must decide how to allocate these to the different contests. In each contest the player who expends more resources than his adversary wins a corresponding prize. Mixed-strategy equilibria are characterized in the case of identical values and budgets and the connections with the classical Blotto game are analyzed.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)738-748
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2007 Sept
Externally publishedYes


  • All-pay auctions
  • Blotto game
  • Budget restrictions
  • Contests

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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