TY - JOUR
T1 - Continuum economies with finite coalitions
T2 - Core, equilibria, and widespread externalities
AU - Hammond, Peter J.
AU - Kaneko, Mamoru
AU - Wooders, Myrna Holtz
PY - 1989
Y1 - 1989
N2 - We develop a new model of a continuum economy with coalitions consisting of only finite numbers of agents. The core, called the f-core, is the set of allocations that are stable against improvement by finite coalitions and feasible by trade within finite coalitions. Even with widespread externalities-preferences depend on own consumptions and also on the entire allocation up to the null set-we obtain the result that the f-core coincides with the Walrasian allocations. Without widespread externalities, the f-core, the Aumann core, and the Walrasian allocations all coincide; however, with widespread externalities there is no obvious natural definition of the Aumann core.
AB - We develop a new model of a continuum economy with coalitions consisting of only finite numbers of agents. The core, called the f-core, is the set of allocations that are stable against improvement by finite coalitions and feasible by trade within finite coalitions. Even with widespread externalities-preferences depend on own consumptions and also on the entire allocation up to the null set-we obtain the result that the f-core coincides with the Walrasian allocations. Without widespread externalities, the f-core, the Aumann core, and the Walrasian allocations all coincide; however, with widespread externalities there is no obvious natural definition of the Aumann core.
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U2 - 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90070-7
DO - 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90070-7
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:38249024080
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 49
SP - 113
EP - 134
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 1
ER -