Conventions, social prejudices and discrimination: A festival game with merrymakers

Mamoru Kaneko*, Toshiyuki Kimura

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

13 Citations (Scopus)


This paper provides a simple game-theoretic account of racial discrimination without assuming individual prejudices as a basic concept. We consider a recurrent situation of a festival game with merrymakers, and give a formulation of a stable convention. We show that stable conventions of one type involve discrimination against one group of players. We look closely into the structure of these stable conventions and consider them in comparison with recent developments of sociological thought on ethnic relations. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers 026, 900 and American Mathematical Society Classification Numbers 90D10, 90D80, 90D99.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)511-527
Number of pages17
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 1992
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance


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