TY - JOUR
T1 - Correction to
T2 - Power-sharing negotiation and commitment in monarchies (Public Choice, (2021), 187, 3-4, (501-518), 10.1007/s11127-020-00792-8)
AU - Inata, Kana
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2021.
PY - 2022/7
Y1 - 2022/7
N2 - My article (Inata, 2021) derives a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in a simple game to analyze power-sharing negotiation and commitment problems between an absolute monarch and the regime’s elites. This equilibrium is, however, not unique, strictly speaking; while it is effectively unique in a behavioral sense because it generates the unique outcomes, it does not rule out all best-reply strategies. The article’s conclusion about the role played by the public nevertheless remains intact. For interested readers, I will detail those equilibria in this correction.
AB - My article (Inata, 2021) derives a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in a simple game to analyze power-sharing negotiation and commitment problems between an absolute monarch and the regime’s elites. This equilibrium is, however, not unique, strictly speaking; while it is effectively unique in a behavioral sense because it generates the unique outcomes, it does not rule out all best-reply strategies. The article’s conclusion about the role played by the public nevertheless remains intact. For interested readers, I will detail those equilibria in this correction.
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U2 - 10.1007/s11127-021-00924-8
DO - 10.1007/s11127-021-00924-8
M3 - Comment/debate
AN - SCOPUS:85113838069
SN - 0048-5829
VL - 192
SP - 189
EP - 191
JO - Public Choice
JF - Public Choice
IS - 1-2
ER -