Decomposing a balanced game: A necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core

Takaaki Abe

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.009

Decomposing a balanced game: A necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core

Takaaki Abe

School of Political Science and Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The Bondareva–Shapley condition is the most eminent necessary and sufficient condition for the core of a transferable utility game to be nonempty. In this paper, we provide a new necessary and sufficient condition. We show that a game has a nonempty core if and only if the game can be decomposed into some simple games.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	9-13
Number of pages	5
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	176
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.009
Publication status	Published - 2019 Mar

Keywords

Cooperative game
Core
Decomposition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2018.12.009

Cite this

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abstract = "The Bondareva–Shapley condition is the most eminent necessary and sufficient condition for the core of a transferable utility game to be nonempty. In this paper, we provide a new necessary and sufficient condition. We show that a game has a nonempty core if and only if the game can be decomposed into some simple games.",

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author = "Takaaki Abe",

note = "Funding Information: The author is grateful to the anonymous referee and the editor for his/her helpful comments and constructive suggestions. The author also thanks Yukihiko Funaki for his advices. Financial support from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) is gratefully acknowledged. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2018 Elsevier B.V.",

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N2 - The Bondareva–Shapley condition is the most eminent necessary and sufficient condition for the core of a transferable utility game to be nonempty. In this paper, we provide a new necessary and sufficient condition. We show that a game has a nonempty core if and only if the game can be decomposed into some simple games.

AB - The Bondareva–Shapley condition is the most eminent necessary and sufficient condition for the core of a transferable utility game to be nonempty. In this paper, we provide a new necessary and sufficient condition. We show that a game has a nonempty core if and only if the game can be decomposed into some simple games.

KW - Cooperative game

KW - Core

KW - Decomposition

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ER -

Decomposing a balanced game: A necessary and sufficient condition for the nonemptiness of the core

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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