TY - JOUR
T1 - Enhancing the physical layer security of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access in cellular internet of things
AU - Zhang, Shuai
AU - Xu, Xiaoming
AU - Wang, Huiming
AU - Peng, Jianhua
AU - Zhang, Di
AU - Huang, Kaizhi
N1 - Funding Information:
This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grants 61501516, 61671364, 61701538, and 61801435, in part by the Project funded by the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation under Grant 2018M633733, in part by the Scientific and Technological Key Project of Henan Province under Grant 182102210449, in part by the Outstanding Young Research Fund of Shaanxi Province under Grant 2018JC-003, and in part by the Scientific Key Research Project of Henan Province for Colleges and Universities under Grant 19A510024.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 IEEE.
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - This paper investigates the physical-layer security of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) in the cellular Internet of Things (IoT) with invoking stochastic geometry. Poisson cluster process-based model is applied to characterize the NOMA uplink transmission scenario, where IoT terminals are located around the serving base station. Considering the severe interference brought by a large number of IoT terminals, inter-cell interference is also taken into account. To enhance the physical-layer security of uplink NOMA transmission with limited overhead increment at IoT terminals, the base stations not only receive the signals from IoT terminals but also keep emitting jamming signals all the time to degrade the performance of any potential eavesdroppers. In order to characterize the physical-layer security performances, we derive expressions of coverage probability and secrecy outage probability. To obtain further insights, network-wide secrecy throughput (NST) and network-wide secrecy energy efficiency (NSEE) are analyzed. It is demonstrated that the security performance can be improved by the proposed full-duplex base station jamming scheme at the cost of reliable performance. The analytical and simulation results show the effects of BS intensity and jamming power on network performances. We also verify that NST and NSEE can be significantly enhanced by our proposed scheme. Using these results, the security of confidential information transmitted by low-complexity IoT terminals can be protected from overhearing.
AB - This paper investigates the physical-layer security of uplink non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) in the cellular Internet of Things (IoT) with invoking stochastic geometry. Poisson cluster process-based model is applied to characterize the NOMA uplink transmission scenario, where IoT terminals are located around the serving base station. Considering the severe interference brought by a large number of IoT terminals, inter-cell interference is also taken into account. To enhance the physical-layer security of uplink NOMA transmission with limited overhead increment at IoT terminals, the base stations not only receive the signals from IoT terminals but also keep emitting jamming signals all the time to degrade the performance of any potential eavesdroppers. In order to characterize the physical-layer security performances, we derive expressions of coverage probability and secrecy outage probability. To obtain further insights, network-wide secrecy throughput (NST) and network-wide secrecy energy efficiency (NSEE) are analyzed. It is demonstrated that the security performance can be improved by the proposed full-duplex base station jamming scheme at the cost of reliable performance. The analytical and simulation results show the effects of BS intensity and jamming power on network performances. We also verify that NST and NSEE can be significantly enhanced by our proposed scheme. Using these results, the security of confidential information transmitted by low-complexity IoT terminals can be protected from overhearing.
KW - Full-duplex receiver
KW - Internet of Things
KW - non-orthogonal multiple access
KW - physical layer security
KW - uplink
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U2 - 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875118
DO - 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2875118
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85054636334
SN - 2169-3536
VL - 6
SP - 58405
EP - 58417
JO - IEEE Access
JF - IEEE Access
M1 - 8488346
ER -