Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains

Tsuyoshi Adachi*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Citations (Scopus)


We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible good among a group of agents in which each agent demands at most one unit of the good and money payment or receipt is required. Under general preference domains that may contain non quasi-linear preferences, the Vickrey allocation rule is characterized by axioms for equity and continuity without use of efficiency: namely, the Vickrey rule is the only rule that satisfies strategy-proofness, weak envy-freeness for equals, non-imposition, and continuity of welfare.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)813-830
Number of pages18
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Jul 7

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


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