Farsighted stable sets in Hotelling's location games

Junnosuke Shino*, Ryo Kawasaki

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


We apply the farsighted stable set to two versions of Hotelling's location games: one with a linear market and another with a circular market. It is shown that there always exists a farsighted stable set in both games, which consists of location profiles that yield equal payoff to all players. This stable set contains location profiles that reflect minimum differentiation as well as those profiles that reflect local monopoly. These results are in contrast to those obtained in the literature that use some variant of Nash equilibrium. While this stable set is unique when the number of players is two, uniqueness no longer holds for both models when the number of players is at least three.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)23-30
Number of pages8
JournalMathematical social sciences
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2012 Jan
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Social Sciences(all)
  • Psychology(all)
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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