TY - GEN
T1 - Games for security under adaptive adversaries
AU - Antonopoulos, Timos
AU - Terauchi, Tachio
N1 - Funding Information:
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We thank the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments and the meticulous examination they performed on this work. This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers 17H01720 and 18K19787, JSPS Core-to-Core Program, A.Advanced Research Networks, Office of Naval Research (ONR) award N00014-17-1-2787 and DARPA award FA8750-15-2-0104.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 IEEE.
PY - 2019/6
Y1 - 2019/6
N2 - This work explores methods for proving and disproving security of systems under adaptive adversaries. Adaptive adversaries are ones which make their next move based on the previous observations. Our first contribution is a new game based characterization of security. We show that the game accurately captures security of deterministic and probabilistic systems against adaptive (probabilistic) adversaries. In addition, we build on top of the game characterization and present techniques that expedite proving the existence of attacker and defender strategies, and consequently proving security or vulnerability of systems. The first is what we call attack (and defense) slopes which give simple sufficient criteria for existence of winning strategies (for attacker and defender). The second is reductions of one game to another achieved by mapping a strategy of one to that of the other. We show that such reductions can prove or disprove security by reducing from a game of a secure system or reducing to that of a non-secure system.
AB - This work explores methods for proving and disproving security of systems under adaptive adversaries. Adaptive adversaries are ones which make their next move based on the previous observations. Our first contribution is a new game based characterization of security. We show that the game accurately captures security of deterministic and probabilistic systems against adaptive (probabilistic) adversaries. In addition, we build on top of the game characterization and present techniques that expedite proving the existence of attacker and defender strategies, and consequently proving security or vulnerability of systems. The first is what we call attack (and defense) slopes which give simple sufficient criteria for existence of winning strategies (for attacker and defender). The second is reductions of one game to another achieved by mapping a strategy of one to that of the other. We show that such reductions can prove or disprove security by reducing from a game of a secure system or reducing to that of a non-secure system.
KW - Adaptive Attacks
KW - Game Theory
KW - Security
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85072614240&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1109/CSF.2019.00022
DO - 10.1109/CSF.2019.00022
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85072614240
T3 - Proceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
SP - 216
EP - 229
BT - Proceedings - 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 32nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019
Y2 - 25 June 2019 through 28 June 2019
ER -