Games for security under adaptive adversaries

Timos Antonopoulos, Tachio Terauchi

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)


This work explores methods for proving and disproving security of systems under adaptive adversaries. Adaptive adversaries are ones which make their next move based on the previous observations. Our first contribution is a new game based characterization of security. We show that the game accurately captures security of deterministic and probabilistic systems against adaptive (probabilistic) adversaries. In addition, we build on top of the game characterization and present techniques that expedite proving the existence of attacker and defender strategies, and consequently proving security or vulnerability of systems. The first is what we call attack (and defense) slopes which give simple sufficient criteria for existence of winning strategies (for attacker and defender). The second is reductions of one game to another achieved by mapping a strategy of one to that of the other. We show that such reductions can prove or disprove security by reducing from a game of a secure system or reducing to that of a non-secure system.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2019 IEEE 32nd Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Number of pages14
ISBN (Electronic)9781728114064
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Jun
Event32nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019 - Hoboken, United States
Duration: 2019 Jun 252019 Jun 28

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium
ISSN (Print)1940-1434


Conference32nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2019
Country/TerritoryUnited States


  • Adaptive Attacks
  • Game Theory
  • Security

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)


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