Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment

Haris Aziz*, Yoichi Kasajima

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

12 Citations (Scopus)


We consider the problem of assigning objects probabilistically among a group of agents who may have multi-unit demands. Each agent has linear preferences over the (set of) objects. The most commonly used extension of preferences to compare probabilistic assignments is by means of stochastic dominance, which leads to corresponding notions of envy-freeness, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. We show that equal treatment of equals, efficiency, and strategy-proofness are incompatible. Moreover, anonymity, neutrality, efficiency, and weak strategy-proofness are incompatible. If we strengthen weak strategy-proofness to weak group strategy-proofness, then when agents have single-unit demands, anonymity, neutrality, efficiency, and weak group strategy-proofness become incompatible.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)255-275
Number of pages21
JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Aug 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Impossibilities for probabilistic assignment'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this