TY - JOUR
T1 - Impossibility theorems with interpersonally comparable welfare levels
T2 - The "extended sympathy approach" reconsidered
AU - Nagahisa, Ryo Ichi
AU - Suga, Koichi
PY - 1998/1/1
Y1 - 1998/1/1
N2 - We re-examine a type of interpersonal welfare comparison, called the "extended sympathy" approach, which Arrow (1977), Hammond (1976) and Roberts (1980a) introduced in order to escape from Arrovian impossibility theorems. In particular, we extend the positional dictatorship theorem due to Roberts to the case where the domain of social choice rules satisfies the axiom of identity. We show that there is a positional dictator if the rule with the domain satisfies independence, Suppes unanimity and monotonicity.
AB - We re-examine a type of interpersonal welfare comparison, called the "extended sympathy" approach, which Arrow (1977), Hammond (1976) and Roberts (1980a) introduced in order to escape from Arrovian impossibility theorems. In particular, we extend the positional dictatorship theorem due to Roberts to the case where the domain of social choice rules satisfies the axiom of identity. We show that there is a positional dictator if the rule with the domain satisfies independence, Suppes unanimity and monotonicity.
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U2 - 10.1111/1468-5876.00078
DO - 10.1111/1468-5876.00078
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0343043318
SN - 1352-4739
VL - 49
SP - 171
EP - 190
JO - Japanese Economic Review
JF - Japanese Economic Review
IS - 2
ER -