Intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant

Hideki Konishi*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


This paper analyzes the relative cost-effectiveness of intergovernmental versus intersource cross-border emissions trading when polluting firms are noncompliant. A special focus is placed on the presence of enforcement costs and the associated credibility problem of governmental monitoring. It is shown that without inspection commitment, the intergovernmental system is more cost-effective because the endorsed flexibility in domestic emission taxation serves as a commitment device for building credibility of monitoring.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)235-261
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2005 Mar
Externally publishedYes


  • Emissions trading
  • Intergovernmental versus intersource
  • Noncompliance
  • Time-consistency of monitoring

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law


Dive into the research topics of 'Intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this