Intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant

Hideki Konishi

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2004.04.003

Intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant

Hideki Konishi^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the relative cost-effectiveness of intergovernmental versus intersource cross-border emissions trading when polluting firms are noncompliant. A special focus is placed on the presence of enforcement costs and the associated credibility problem of governmental monitoring. It is shown that without inspection commitment, the intergovernmental system is more cost-effective because the endorsed flexibility in domestic emission taxation serves as a commitment device for building credibility of monitoring.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	235-261
Number of pages	27
Journal	Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume	49
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2004.04.003
Publication status	Published - 2005 Mar
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Emissions trading
Intergovernmental versus intersource
Noncompliance
Time-consistency of monitoring

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics
Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law

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10.1016/j.jeem.2004.04.003

Cite this

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abstract = "This paper analyzes the relative cost-effectiveness of intergovernmental versus intersource cross-border emissions trading when polluting firms are noncompliant. A special focus is placed on the presence of enforcement costs and the associated credibility problem of governmental monitoring. It is shown that without inspection commitment, the intergovernmental system is more cost-effective because the endorsed flexibility in domestic emission taxation serves as a commitment device for building credibility of monitoring.",

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AB - This paper analyzes the relative cost-effectiveness of intergovernmental versus intersource cross-border emissions trading when polluting firms are noncompliant. A special focus is placed on the presence of enforcement costs and the associated credibility problem of governmental monitoring. It is shown that without inspection commitment, the intergovernmental system is more cost-effective because the endorsed flexibility in domestic emission taxation serves as a commitment device for building credibility of monitoring.

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KW - Noncompliance

KW - Time-consistency of monitoring

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Intergovernmental versus intersource emissions trading when firms are noncompliant

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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