Law enforcement with criminal organizations and endogenous collaboration

Ken Yahagi*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


This paper proposes a simple framework consisting of a law enforcement model in which criminal organizations (Mafias) can collaborate with each other to control an illegal market. Within this framework, we investigate two different situations: (1) a single monopolistic criminal organization operation or (2) an organization collaborating with another criminal organization. Depending on the quality of the controlled illegal market, the welfare implications of these scenarios vary. This paper also investigates an incentive for criminal organizations to engage in endogenous cooperation. As a result, we explore how criminal organizations’ incentives coincide with social welfare implications.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)351-363
Number of pages13
JournalEuropean Journal of Law and Economics
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Dec 1


  • Cooperation
  • Criminal organization
  • Gang
  • Law enforcement
  • Monopolization

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Law


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