TY - JOUR
T1 - Learning games
AU - Hanaki, Nobuyuki
AU - Ishikawa, Ryuichiro
AU - Akiyama, Eizo
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Mamoru Kaneko, Jeff Kline, Daisuke Oyama, and seminar participants at GREQAM for comments and suggestions. This research is partially supported by a Japan Society for the Promotion of Sciences Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (S), no. 17103002, and by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Grants-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B), nos. 19730137 and 19730164.
PY - 2009/10
Y1 - 2009/10
N2 - This paper presents a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little knowledge about the game. Through playing the same game repeatedly, each player not only learns which action to choose but also constructs a personal view of the game. The model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma and coordination games. Results of computer simulations show that (1) when all the players are slow at learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but might enjoy higher payoffs than in cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one player is quick in learning the game, that player obtains a higher payoff than the others. However, all can receive lower payoffs than in the case in which all players are slow learners.
AB - This paper presents a model of learning about a game. Players initially have little knowledge about the game. Through playing the same game repeatedly, each player not only learns which action to choose but also constructs a personal view of the game. The model is studied using a hybrid payoff matrix of the prisoner's dilemma and coordination games. Results of computer simulations show that (1) when all the players are slow at learning the game, they have only a partial understanding of the game, but might enjoy higher payoffs than in cases with full or no understanding of the game; (2) when one player is quick in learning the game, that player obtains a higher payoff than the others. However, all can receive lower payoffs than in the case in which all players are slow learners.
KW - Computer simulation
KW - Learning
KW - Subjective views
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jedc.2009.02.013
DO - 10.1016/j.jedc.2009.02.013
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:68849112925
SN - 0165-1889
VL - 33
SP - 1739
EP - 1756
JO - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
JF - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
IS - 10
ER -