Linking Decisions with Standardization

Róbert F. Veszteg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This article proposes a simple mechanism that can be operated without monetary transfers in situations where a group of agents have to decide over a series of common projects and they are not informed about each other’s valuations. It is shown that efficient public decisions can be made by aggregating the standardized values of the declared individual valuations if the number of agents and the number of decision problems are sufficiently large.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)35-48
Number of pages14
JournalStudies in Microeconomics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jun 1


  • Efficiency
  • linking mechanism
  • public project
  • risk
  • standardization

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)


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