Linking Decisions with Standardization

Róbert F. Veszteg

doi:10.1177/2321022215577548

Linking Decisions with Standardization

Róbert F. Veszteg^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Political Science and Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

This article proposes a simple mechanism that can be operated without monetary transfers in situations where a group of agents have to decide over a series of common projects and they are not informed about each other’s valuations. It is shown that efficient public decisions can be made by aggregating the standardized values of the declared individual valuations if the number of agents and the number of decision problems are sufficiently large.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	35-48
Number of pages	14
Journal	Studies in Microeconomics
Volume	3
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1177/2321022215577548
Publication status	Published - 2015 Jun 1

Keywords

Efficiency
linking mechanism
public project
risk
standardization

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Economics,Econometrics and Finance

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10.1177/2321022215577548

Cite this

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AB - This article proposes a simple mechanism that can be operated without monetary transfers in situations where a group of agents have to decide over a series of common projects and they are not informed about each other’s valuations. It is shown that efficient public decisions can be made by aggregating the standardized values of the declared individual valuations if the number of agents and the number of decision problems are sufficiently large.

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Linking Decisions with Standardization

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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