My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms

Brice Corgnet; Angela Sutan; Róbert F. Veszteg

doi:10.1016/j.socec.2010.09.005

My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms

Brice Corgnet^*, Angela Sutan, Róbert F. Veszteg

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in which merit could play an important role. The inability of high-ability individuals to claim a large share of the joint profits makes the dissolution of inefficient teams difficult, and results in unprofitable cooperation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	347-355
Number of pages	9
Journal	Journal of Socio-Economics
Volume	40
Issue number	4
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2010.09.005
Publication status	Published - 2011 Aug
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Equity and equality norms
Experiments
Team formation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.socec.2010.09.005

Cite this

@article{ad7a3beb23a64150bc79f63bafbfd3da,

title = "My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms",

abstract = "We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in which merit could play an important role. The inability of high-ability individuals to claim a large share of the joint profits makes the dissolution of inefficient teams difficult, and results in unprofitable cooperation.",

keywords = "Equity and equality norms, Experiments, Team formation",

author = "Brice Corgnet and Angela Sutan and Veszteg, {R{\'o}bert F.}",

note = "Funding Information: This research was supported by the Natural Science Foundation of China (41330526 and 41711530148) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (XDB03030101-4). The authors grate fully acknowledge the NOAA Air Resource Laboratory (ARL) for the provision of the HYSPLIT transport and dispersion model and/or READY web site (http://www.ready.noaa.gov) used in this publication. To better facilitate readers to understand the results, the data utilized in this manuscript are presented in Data Set S1.",

year = "2011",

month = aug,

doi = "10.1016/j.socec.2010.09.005",

language = "English",

volume = "40",

pages = "347--355",

journal = "Journal of Socio-Economics",

issn = "1053-5357",

publisher = "Elsevier Inc.",

number = "4",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - My teammate, myself and I

T2 - Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms

AU - Corgnet, Brice

AU - Sutan, Angela

AU - Veszteg, Róbert F.

N1 - Funding Information: This research was supported by the Natural Science Foundation of China (41330526 and 41711530148) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (XDB03030101-4). The authors grate fully acknowledge the NOAA Air Resource Laboratory (ARL) for the provision of the HYSPLIT transport and dispersion model and/or READY web site (http://www.ready.noaa.gov) used in this publication. To better facilitate readers to understand the results, the data utilized in this manuscript are presented in Data Set S1.

PY - 2011/8

Y1 - 2011/8

N2 - We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in which merit could play an important role. The inability of high-ability individuals to claim a large share of the joint profits makes the dissolution of inefficient teams difficult, and results in unprofitable cooperation.

AB - We study team formation in real-effort experiments in which participants bargain over a jointly produced outcome. Participants decide between undertaking a task alone or with another participant by releasing the minimum share of the future team outcome that they are willing to accept. We find that the equality norm prevails in a context in which merit could play an important role. The inability of high-ability individuals to claim a large share of the joint profits makes the dissolution of inefficient teams difficult, and results in unprofitable cooperation.

KW - Equity and equality norms

KW - Experiments

KW - Team formation

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=79957621603&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=79957621603&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.socec.2010.09.005

DO - 10.1016/j.socec.2010.09.005

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:79957621603

SN - 1053-5357

VL - 40

SP - 347

EP - 355

JO - Journal of Socio-Economics

JF - Journal of Socio-Economics

IS - 4

ER -

My teammate, myself and I: Experimental evidence on equity and equality norms

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this