Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory

Mamoru Kaneko

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(75)90026-5

Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory

Mamoru Kaneko^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity of the social preferences given by two types of social decision processes. We consider transitivity of the dominance relation of a proper simple game and that of the social preference given by the simple majority decision rule.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	385-393
Number of pages	9
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	11
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90026-5
Publication status	Published - 1975
Externally published	Yes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0022-0531(75)90026-5

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title = "Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory",

abstract = "In this paper we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity of the social preferences given by two types of social decision processes. We consider transitivity of the dominance relation of a proper simple game and that of the social preference given by the simple majority decision rule.",

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year = "1975",

doi = "10.1016/0022-0531(75)90026-5",

language = "English",

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AU - Kaneko, Mamoru

PY - 1975

Y1 - 1975

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JO - Journal of Economic Theory

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Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory

Abstract

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