One-Round Authenticated Group Key Exchange from Isogenies

Atsushi Fujioka; Katsuyuki Takashima; Kazuki Yoneyama

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-31919-9_20

One-Round Authenticated Group Key Exchange from Isogenies

Atsushi Fujioka, Katsuyuki Takashima, Kazuki Yoneyama^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

9 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper proposes two one-round authenticated group key exchange protocols from newly employed cryptographic invariant maps (CIMs): one is secure in the quantum random oracle model and the other resists against maximum exposure where a non-trivial combination of secret keys is revealed. The security of the former (resp. latter) is proved under the n-way decisional (resp. n-way gap) Diffie–Hellman assumption on the CIMs in the quantum random (resp. random) oracle model. We instantiate the proposed protocols on the hard homogeneous spaces with limitation where the number of the user group is two. In particular, the protocols instantiated by using the CSIDH, commutative supersingular isogeny Diffie–Hellman, key exchange are currently more realistic than the general n-party CIM-based ones due to its realizability. Our two-party one-round protocols are secure against quantum adversaries.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Provable Security - 13th International Conference, ProvSec 2019, Proceedings
Editors	Ron Steinfeld, Tsz Hon Yuen
Publisher	Springer
Pages	330-338
Number of pages	9
ISBN (Print)	9783030319182
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31919-9_20
Publication status	Published - 2019
Externally published	Yes
Event	13th International Conference on Provable and Practical Security, ProvSec 2019 - Cairns, Australia Duration: 2019 Oct 1 → 2019 Oct 4

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	11821 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Conference

Conference	13th International Conference on Provable and Practical Security, ProvSec 2019
Country/Territory	Australia
City	Cairns
Period	19/10/1 → 19/10/4

Keywords

Commutative supersingular isogeny Diffie–Hellman
Cryptographic invariant maps
G-CK model
G-CK model
Hard homogeneous spaces
One-round authenticated group key exchange
Quantum adversary

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
Computer Science(all)

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-030-31919-9_20

Cite this

Fujioka, A., Takashima, K., & Yoneyama, K. (2019). One-Round Authenticated Group Key Exchange from Isogenies. In R. Steinfeld, & T. H. Yuen (Eds.), Provable Security - 13th International Conference, ProvSec 2019, Proceedings (pp. 330-338). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11821 LNCS). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31919-9_20

One-Round Authenticated Group Key Exchange from Isogenies. / Fujioka, Atsushi; Takashima, Katsuyuki; Yoneyama, Kazuki.
Provable Security - 13th International Conference, ProvSec 2019, Proceedings. ed. / Ron Steinfeld; Tsz Hon Yuen. Springer, 2019. p. 330-338 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 11821 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Fujioka, A, Takashima, K & Yoneyama, K 2019, One-Round Authenticated Group Key Exchange from Isogenies. in R Steinfeld & TH Yuen (eds), Provable Security - 13th International Conference, ProvSec 2019, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 11821 LNCS, Springer, pp. 330-338, 13th International Conference on Provable and Practical Security, ProvSec 2019, Cairns, Australia, 19/10/1. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-31919-9_20

Fujioka A, Takashima K, Yoneyama K. One-Round Authenticated Group Key Exchange from Isogenies. In Steinfeld R, Yuen TH, editors, Provable Security - 13th International Conference, ProvSec 2019, Proceedings. Springer. 2019. p. 330-338. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-030-31919-9_20

Fujioka, Atsushi ; Takashima, Katsuyuki ; Yoneyama, Kazuki. / One-Round Authenticated Group Key Exchange from Isogenies. Provable Security - 13th International Conference, ProvSec 2019, Proceedings. editor / Ron Steinfeld ; Tsz Hon Yuen. Springer, 2019. pp. 330-338 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)).

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AB - This paper proposes two one-round authenticated group key exchange protocols from newly employed cryptographic invariant maps (CIMs): one is secure in the quantum random oracle model and the other resists against maximum exposure where a non-trivial combination of secret keys is revealed. The security of the former (resp. latter) is proved under the n-way decisional (resp. n-way gap) Diffie–Hellman assumption on the CIMs in the quantum random (resp. random) oracle model. We instantiate the proposed protocols on the hard homogeneous spaces with limitation where the number of the user group is two. In particular, the protocols instantiated by using the CSIDH, commutative supersingular isogeny Diffie–Hellman, key exchange are currently more realistic than the general n-party CIM-based ones due to its realizability. Our two-party one-round protocols are secure against quantum adversaries.

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One-Round Authenticated Group Key Exchange from Isogenies

Abstract

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Conference

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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