Optimal bidding and worst case pricing under dynamic integration mechanism for LQG power networks

Toshiyuki Murao, Kenji Hirata, Kenko Uchida

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

    3 Citations (Scopus)


    We investigate an optimal bidding and an optimal and worst case pricing under a dynamic integration mechanism for linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) power networks. The participant of the dynamic integration mechanism is divided into two kind of players, that are generators and/or consumers, called agents, and one public commission, called utility. In the mechanism, each agent decides private control to minimize his/her own cost functional, and the utility decides prices and incentives to minimize a public cost functional. The dynamic integration mechanism satisfies both public optimality by private optimal controls of each agent and incentive compatibility. In this setting, we present an optimal bidding strategy under the condition such that each agent selects his/her preference from a set of his/her preferences and reports his/her state truthfully. Based on the proposed optimal bidding strategy, each agent can select his/her optimal preference which minimizes his/her minimal private cost. In addition, we discuss optimal pricing and worst case pricing for the whole power networks.

    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publication2015 European Control Conference, ECC 2015
    PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
    Number of pages6
    ISBN (Print)9783952426937
    Publication statusPublished - 2015 Nov 16
    EventEuropean Control Conference, ECC 2015 - Linz, Austria
    Duration: 2015 Jul 152015 Jul 17


    OtherEuropean Control Conference, ECC 2015

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Control and Systems Engineering


    Dive into the research topics of 'Optimal bidding and worst case pricing under dynamic integration mechanism for LQG power networks'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this