Partially binding platforms: Campaign Promises vis-à-vis cost of betrayal

Yasushi Asako*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

4 Citations (Scopus)


This study examines and models the effects of partially binding campaign platforms in a political competition. Here, a candidate who implements a policy that differs from the platform must pay a cost of betrayal, which increases with the size of the discrepancy. I also analyse endogenous decisions by citizens to run for an election. In particular, the model is able to show two implications that previous frameworks have had difficulty with. First, candidates with different characteristics have different probabilities of winning an election. Second, even knowing that he/she will lose an election, a candidate will still run, hoping to make an opponent's policy approach his/her own policy.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)322-353
Number of pages32
JournalJapanese Economic Review
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Sept 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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