Parties for hire: How particularistic parties influence presidents’ governing strategies

Marisa Kellam*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

29 Citations (Scopus)


I argue that political parties oriented towards particularistic goods affect coalition government in presidential systems. Particularistic parties hire out their support on some item(s) of the presidential agenda in exchange for locally targeted policies or resources under the control of presidents. They are relatively cheap coalition partners for presidents in policy terms and their representation in the legislature provides presidents with coalitional flexibility. My empirical analysis of cabinets in 10 Latin American countries shows that when particularistic parties hold a larger share of the legislative seats minority presidents are less likely to form majority governments and more likely to change the party composition of their cabinets.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)515-526
Number of pages12
JournalParty Politics
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2015 Jul 19


  • Empirical research
  • Latin America
  • office goals
  • presidential cabinets
  • theory construction

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science


Dive into the research topics of 'Parties for hire: How particularistic parties influence presidents’ governing strategies'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this