Perfectly secure message transmission against rational timid adversaries

Maiki Fujita, Kenji Yasunaga, Takeshi Koshiba*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)


Secure Message Transmission (SMT) is a two-party cryptographic protocol by which the sender can securely and reliably transmit messages to the receiver using multiple channels. It is assumed that an adversary corrupts a subset of the channels, and makes eavesdropping and tampering over the corrupted channels. In this work, we consider a game-theoretic security model for SMT. Specifically, we introduce a rational adversary who has the preference for the outcome of the protocol execution. We show that, under some reasonable assumption on the adversary’s preference, even if the adversary corrupts all but one of the channels, it is possible to construct SMT protocols with perfect security against rational adversaries. More specifically, we consider “timid” adversaries who prefer to violate the security requirement of SMT, but do not prefer the tampering actions to be detected. In the traditional cryptographic setting, perfect SMT can be constructed only when the adversary corrupt a minority of the channels. Our results demonstrate a way of circumventing the impossibility results of cryptographic protocols based on a game-theoretic approach.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationDecision and Game Theory for Security - 9th International Conference, GameSec 2018, Proceedings
EditorsLinda Bushnell, Radha Poovendran, Tamer Basar
PublisherSpringer Verlag
Number of pages18
ISBN (Print)9783030015534
Publication statusPublished - 2018
Event9th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2018 - Seattle, United States
Duration: 2018 Oct 292018 Oct 31

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume11199 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349


Other9th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2018
Country/TerritoryUnited States


  • Cryptography
  • Game theory
  • Rational adversary
  • Secure message transmission

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)


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