TY - GEN
T1 - Perfectly secure message transmission against rational timid adversaries
AU - Fujita, Maiki
AU - Yasunaga, Kenji
AU - Koshiba, Takeshi
N1 - Funding Information:
Acknowledgements. This work was supported in part by JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research Numbers 16H01705, 17H01695, and 18K11159. The second author thanks to Masaki Ueno for discussions about this work.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, Springer Nature Switzerland AG.
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - Secure Message Transmission (SMT) is a two-party cryptographic protocol by which the sender can securely and reliably transmit messages to the receiver using multiple channels. It is assumed that an adversary corrupts a subset of the channels, and makes eavesdropping and tampering over the corrupted channels. In this work, we consider a game-theoretic security model for SMT. Specifically, we introduce a rational adversary who has the preference for the outcome of the protocol execution. We show that, under some reasonable assumption on the adversary’s preference, even if the adversary corrupts all but one of the channels, it is possible to construct SMT protocols with perfect security against rational adversaries. More specifically, we consider “timid” adversaries who prefer to violate the security requirement of SMT, but do not prefer the tampering actions to be detected. In the traditional cryptographic setting, perfect SMT can be constructed only when the adversary corrupt a minority of the channels. Our results demonstrate a way of circumventing the impossibility results of cryptographic protocols based on a game-theoretic approach.
AB - Secure Message Transmission (SMT) is a two-party cryptographic protocol by which the sender can securely and reliably transmit messages to the receiver using multiple channels. It is assumed that an adversary corrupts a subset of the channels, and makes eavesdropping and tampering over the corrupted channels. In this work, we consider a game-theoretic security model for SMT. Specifically, we introduce a rational adversary who has the preference for the outcome of the protocol execution. We show that, under some reasonable assumption on the adversary’s preference, even if the adversary corrupts all but one of the channels, it is possible to construct SMT protocols with perfect security against rational adversaries. More specifically, we consider “timid” adversaries who prefer to violate the security requirement of SMT, but do not prefer the tampering actions to be detected. In the traditional cryptographic setting, perfect SMT can be constructed only when the adversary corrupt a minority of the channels. Our results demonstrate a way of circumventing the impossibility results of cryptographic protocols based on a game-theoretic approach.
KW - Cryptography
KW - Game theory
KW - Rational adversary
KW - Secure message transmission
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-030-01554-1_8
DO - 10.1007/978-3-030-01554-1_8
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85055892035
SN - 9783030015534
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 127
EP - 144
BT - Decision and Game Theory for Security - 9th International Conference, GameSec 2018, Proceedings
A2 - Bushnell, Linda
A2 - Poovendran, Radha
A2 - Basar, Tamer
PB - Springer Verlag
T2 - 9th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2018
Y2 - 29 October 2018 through 31 October 2018
ER -