TY - GEN
T1 - Real-time pricing for on-demand bandwidth reservation in SDN-enabled networks
AU - Gu, Bo
AU - Dong, Mianxiong
AU - Zhang, Cheng
AU - Liu, Zhi
AU - Tanaka, Yoshiaki
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2017 IEEE.
PY - 2017/7/17
Y1 - 2017/7/17
N2 - Software-defined networking (SDN) enables network subscribers to negotiate QoS parameters in a on-demand basis. On the other hand, peak-time congestion accompanying the fast-growing traffic in recent years forces Internet service provider (ISP) to put forward a new pricing scheme by taking into account when a user uses Internet in addition to how much a user uses Internet. In this paper, we study the payoff optimization problem of ISP and network subscribers in SDN-enabled networks. A self-interested network subscriber always tries to obtain network resources as much as possible even if the network is congested; on the other hand, rational ISP tends to charge a higher price without providing subscribers guaranteed Quality of Service (QoS). A Stackelberg game is hence constructed to analyze the competitive interactions between ISP and home network subscribers. Specifically, ISP decides its pricing strategy for each time slot by solving a payoff optimization problem. Given the pricing strategy, network subscribers then decide the bandwidth to be reserved in a on-demand basis aiming to optimize their own payoff as well. We analyze the Nash equilibrium solution of the game. Simulation results confirm that the proposed pricing scheme can largely improve the payoff of network subscribers and ISP, compared to the usage-based pricing (UBP) scheme. Furthermore, the portion of surplus obtained by ISP increases with the increase of traffic load.
AB - Software-defined networking (SDN) enables network subscribers to negotiate QoS parameters in a on-demand basis. On the other hand, peak-time congestion accompanying the fast-growing traffic in recent years forces Internet service provider (ISP) to put forward a new pricing scheme by taking into account when a user uses Internet in addition to how much a user uses Internet. In this paper, we study the payoff optimization problem of ISP and network subscribers in SDN-enabled networks. A self-interested network subscriber always tries to obtain network resources as much as possible even if the network is congested; on the other hand, rational ISP tends to charge a higher price without providing subscribers guaranteed Quality of Service (QoS). A Stackelberg game is hence constructed to analyze the competitive interactions between ISP and home network subscribers. Specifically, ISP decides its pricing strategy for each time slot by solving a payoff optimization problem. Given the pricing strategy, network subscribers then decide the bandwidth to be reserved in a on-demand basis aiming to optimize their own payoff as well. We analyze the Nash equilibrium solution of the game. Simulation results confirm that the proposed pricing scheme can largely improve the payoff of network subscribers and ISP, compared to the usage-based pricing (UBP) scheme. Furthermore, the portion of surplus obtained by ISP increases with the increase of traffic load.
KW - On-demand
KW - OpenFlow
KW - Pricing
KW - QoS
KW - SDN
KW - Traffic load
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85027400270&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85027400270&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/CCNC.2017.7983216
DO - 10.1109/CCNC.2017.7983216
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85027400270
T3 - 2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017
SP - 696
EP - 699
BT - 2017 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 14th IEEE Annual Consumer Communications and Networking Conference, CCNC 2017
Y2 - 8 January 2017 through 11 January 2017
ER -