TY - JOUR
T1 - Relationally equal treatment of equals and affine combinations of values for TU games
AU - Yokote, Koji
AU - Kongo, Takumi
AU - Funaki, Yukihiko
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2019/8/1
Y1 - 2019/8/1
N2 - We axiomatize the set of affine combinations between the Shapley value, the equal surplus division value, and the equal division value in cooperative games with transferable utilities. The set is characterized by efficiency, linearity, the balanced contributions property for equal contributors and outsiders, and the differential null player out property. The balanced contributions property for equal contributors and outsiders requires the balance of contributions between two players who contribute the same amount to the grand coalition and whose singleton coalitions earn the same worth. The differential null player out property requires that an elimination of a null player affects the other players identically. These two relational axioms are obtained by investigating Myerson’s (Int J Game Theory 9:169–182, 1980) balanced contributions property and Derks and Haller’s (Int Game Theory Rev 1:301–314, 1999) null player out property, respectively, from the perspective of a principle of Aristotle’s distributive justice, whereby “equals should be treated equally”.
AB - We axiomatize the set of affine combinations between the Shapley value, the equal surplus division value, and the equal division value in cooperative games with transferable utilities. The set is characterized by efficiency, linearity, the balanced contributions property for equal contributors and outsiders, and the differential null player out property. The balanced contributions property for equal contributors and outsiders requires the balance of contributions between two players who contribute the same amount to the grand coalition and whose singleton coalitions earn the same worth. The differential null player out property requires that an elimination of a null player affects the other players identically. These two relational axioms are obtained by investigating Myerson’s (Int J Game Theory 9:169–182, 1980) balanced contributions property and Derks and Haller’s (Int Game Theory Rev 1:301–314, 1999) null player out property, respectively, from the perspective of a principle of Aristotle’s distributive justice, whereby “equals should be treated equally”.
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U2 - 10.1007/s00355-019-01180-y
DO - 10.1007/s00355-019-01180-y
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85062722534
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 53
SP - 197
EP - 212
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 2
ER -