Robust and secure implementation: Equivalence theorems

Tsuyoshi Adachi

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.015

Robust and secure implementation: Equivalence theorems

Tsuyoshi Adachi^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Political Science and Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper shows that in private value environments, strategy-proofness and the rectangular property are necessary conditions for (full) robust implementation (Bergemann and Morris, 2011). As corollaries, we obtain the equivalence between robust and secure implementation (Saijo et al., 2007), the revelation principle for robust implementation, and characterization of double implementation in robust and secure implementation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	96-101
Number of pages	6
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	86
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.015
Publication status	Published - 2014 Jul

Keywords

Full implementation
Private values
Robust implementation
Secure implementation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2014.03.015

Cite this

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title = "Robust and secure implementation: Equivalence theorems",

abstract = "This paper shows that in private value environments, strategy-proofness and the rectangular property are necessary conditions for (full) robust implementation (Bergemann and Morris, 2011). As corollaries, we obtain the equivalence between robust and secure implementation (Saijo et al., 2007), the revelation principle for robust implementation, and characterization of double implementation in robust and secure implementation.",

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AB - This paper shows that in private value environments, strategy-proofness and the rectangular property are necessary conditions for (full) robust implementation (Bergemann and Morris, 2011). As corollaries, we obtain the equivalence between robust and secure implementation (Saijo et al., 2007), the revelation principle for robust implementation, and characterization of double implementation in robust and secure implementation.

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KW - Secure implementation

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JO - Games and Economic Behavior

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ER -

Robust and secure implementation: Equivalence theorems

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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