Russell’s theories of judgement

Ryo Ito*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper is an attempt to explain why Russell abandoned the ontology of propositions, mind-independent complex entities that are possible objects of judgements. I argue that he did so not because of any decisive argument but because he found it better to endorse the existential account of truth, according to which a judgement is true if and only if there exists (or in his view subsists) a corresponding fact. In order to endorse this account, he had examined various theories of judgement before he adopted the multiple-relation theory of judgement, the most feasible way he then had of espousing it. I also attempt to explain why he preferred the existential account of truth.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)112-133
Number of pages22
JournalBritish Journal for the History of Philosophy
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2020 Jan 2
Externally publishedYes


  • fact
  • judgement
  • proposition
  • Russell
  • truth

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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