TY - JOUR
T1 - Russell’s theories of judgement
AU - Ito, Ryo
N1 - Funding Information:
I should like to thank Peter Sullivan for his insightful comments on earlier versions of the present work. I am also grateful to Philip Ebert and Ian Proops for their comments on my PhD thesis, a core part of which has become this essay. Some drafts of the essay were also presented in University of St Andrews (2016), The 5th Seoul Philosophy Graduate Conference (2017), Nagoya University (2018) and Keio University (2018). I am grateful to the participants for their comments. I also thank two anonymous referees and the editor, Michael Beaney, for their helpful comments.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019, © 2019 BSHP.
PY - 2020/1/2
Y1 - 2020/1/2
N2 - This paper is an attempt to explain why Russell abandoned the ontology of propositions, mind-independent complex entities that are possible objects of judgements. I argue that he did so not because of any decisive argument but because he found it better to endorse the existential account of truth, according to which a judgement is true if and only if there exists (or in his view subsists) a corresponding fact. In order to endorse this account, he had examined various theories of judgement before he adopted the multiple-relation theory of judgement, the most feasible way he then had of espousing it. I also attempt to explain why he preferred the existential account of truth.
AB - This paper is an attempt to explain why Russell abandoned the ontology of propositions, mind-independent complex entities that are possible objects of judgements. I argue that he did so not because of any decisive argument but because he found it better to endorse the existential account of truth, according to which a judgement is true if and only if there exists (or in his view subsists) a corresponding fact. In order to endorse this account, he had examined various theories of judgement before he adopted the multiple-relation theory of judgement, the most feasible way he then had of espousing it. I also attempt to explain why he preferred the existential account of truth.
KW - fact
KW - judgement
KW - proposition
KW - Russell
KW - truth
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U2 - 10.1080/09608788.2019.1604315
DO - 10.1080/09608788.2019.1604315
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85066074303
SN - 0960-8788
VL - 28
SP - 112
EP - 133
JO - British Journal for the History of Philosophy
JF - British Journal for the History of Philosophy
IS - 1
ER -