Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems

Takashi Akahoshi*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)


    We explore two necessary and sufficient conditions for the singleton core in college admissions problems. One is a condition on the colleges' preference profiles, called acyclicity, and the other is a condition on their capacity vectors. We also study the implications of our acyclicity condition. The student-optimal stable matching is strongly efficient for the students, given an acyclic profile of the colleges' preference relations. Even when the colleges' true preference profile is acyclic, a college may be better off by misreporting its preference when the college-optimal stable mechanism is used.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)7-13
    Number of pages7
    JournalMathematical Social Sciences
    Publication statusPublished - 2014 Nov 1

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
    • Social Sciences(all)
    • Psychology(all)
    • Sociology and Political Science


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