Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems

Takashi Akahoshi

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.09.001

Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems

Takashi Akahoshi^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

We explore two necessary and sufficient conditions for the singleton core in college admissions problems. One is a condition on the colleges' preference profiles, called acyclicity, and the other is a condition on their capacity vectors. We also study the implications of our acyclicity condition. The student-optimal stable matching is strongly efficient for the students, given an acyclic profile of the colleges' preference relations. Even when the colleges' true preference profile is acyclic, a college may be better off by misreporting its preference when the college-optimal stable mechanism is used.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	7-13
Number of pages	7
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	72
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.09.001
Publication status	Published - 2014 Nov 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
Social Sciences(all)
Psychology(all)
Sociology and Political Science

Access to Document

10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.09.001

Cite this

@article{7c0081837ed641f3a094340f7d93f3c7,

title = "Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems",

abstract = "We explore two necessary and sufficient conditions for the singleton core in college admissions problems. One is a condition on the colleges' preference profiles, called acyclicity, and the other is a condition on their capacity vectors. We also study the implications of our acyclicity condition. The student-optimal stable matching is strongly efficient for the students, given an acyclic profile of the colleges' preference relations. Even when the colleges' true preference profile is acyclic, a college may be better off by misreporting its preference when the college-optimal stable mechanism is used.",

author = "Takashi Akahoshi",

year = "2014",

month = nov,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.09.001",

language = "English",

volume = "72",

pages = "7--13",

journal = "Mathematical Social Sciences",

issn = "0165-4896",

publisher = "Elsevier",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems

AU - Akahoshi, Takashi

PY - 2014/11/1

Y1 - 2014/11/1

N2 - We explore two necessary and sufficient conditions for the singleton core in college admissions problems. One is a condition on the colleges' preference profiles, called acyclicity, and the other is a condition on their capacity vectors. We also study the implications of our acyclicity condition. The student-optimal stable matching is strongly efficient for the students, given an acyclic profile of the colleges' preference relations. Even when the colleges' true preference profile is acyclic, a college may be better off by misreporting its preference when the college-optimal stable mechanism is used.

AB - We explore two necessary and sufficient conditions for the singleton core in college admissions problems. One is a condition on the colleges' preference profiles, called acyclicity, and the other is a condition on their capacity vectors. We also study the implications of our acyclicity condition. The student-optimal stable matching is strongly efficient for the students, given an acyclic profile of the colleges' preference relations. Even when the colleges' true preference profile is acyclic, a college may be better off by misreporting its preference when the college-optimal stable mechanism is used.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84908053032&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84908053032&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.09.001

DO - 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.09.001

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84908053032

SN - 0165-4896

VL - 72

SP - 7

EP - 13

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

ER -

Singleton core in many-to-one matching problems

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this