Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory

Mamoru Kaneko

doi:10.1016/0165-4896(82)90075-0

Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory

Mamoru Kaneko^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

20 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

It is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	281-290
Number of pages	10
Journal	Mathematical Social Sciences
Volume	3
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90075-0
Publication status	Published - 1982
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Nash equilibrium
observation structure
super game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/0165-4896(82)90075-0

Cite this

@article{01291217f7b844f08da6d4cddbf1d7b8,

title = "Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory",

abstract = "It is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.",

keywords = "Nash equilibrium, observation structure, super game",

author = "Mamoru Kaneko",

year = "1982",

doi = "10.1016/0165-4896(82)90075-0",

language = "English",

volume = "3",

pages = "281--290",

journal = "Mathematical Social Sciences",

issn = "0165-4896",

publisher = "Elsevier",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory

AU - Kaneko, Mamoru

PY - 1982

Y1 - 1982

N2 - It is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.

AB - It is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - observation structure

KW - super game

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0007236270&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0007236270&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/0165-4896(82)90075-0

DO - 10.1016/0165-4896(82)90075-0

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0007236270

SN - 0165-4896

VL - 3

SP - 281

EP - 290

JO - Mathematical Social Sciences

JF - Mathematical Social Sciences

IS - 3

ER -

Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this