Some remarks on the folk theorem in game theory

Mamoru Kaneko*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

21 Citations (Scopus)


It is argued that although the pathological multiplicity of Nash equilibria of super games stated by the folk theorem can be removed by introducing limited observations into super games with a continuum of players, the consideration of super games in terms of the Nash equilibrium concept involves a more fundamental and conceptual difficulty.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)281-290
Number of pages10
JournalMathematical Social Sciences
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 1982
Externally publishedYes


  • Nash equilibrium
  • observation structure
  • super game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty
  • Economics and Econometrics


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