Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation

Yoshio Kamijo

doi:10.1007/s11238-012-9347-y

Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation

Yoshio Kamijo^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study the stable standard of behavior in a perfect foresight situation that was introduced by Xue (Econ Theory 11:603-627, 1998). We assume that the inducement relations are invertible and coalition free. We show that the conditions are sufficient for the existence of the nonempty-valued optimistic/conservative stable standard of behavior for perfect foresight situation (OSSB-PF/CSSB-PF). Moreover, we find that an OSSB-PF supports a Pareto-efficient outcome as a stable outcome; if the preference relations are strict, only the Pareto-efficient outcomes are supported by the OSSB-PF.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	339-357
Number of pages	19
Journal	Theory and Decision
Volume	75
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9347-y
Publication status	Published - 2013 Sept
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

CSSB
Coalition formation
Coalition-free inducement relations
Invertible inducement relations
OSSB
Perfect foresight

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Decision Sciences(all)
Developmental and Educational Psychology
Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
Applied Psychology
Social Sciences(all)
Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
Computer Science Applications

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10.1007/s11238-012-9347-y

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@article{dd89037148a74eb2943600e45462b6b9,

title = "Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation",

abstract = "We study the stable standard of behavior in a perfect foresight situation that was introduced by Xue (Econ Theory 11:603-627, 1998). We assume that the inducement relations are invertible and coalition free. We show that the conditions are sufficient for the existence of the nonempty-valued optimistic/conservative stable standard of behavior for perfect foresight situation (OSSB-PF/CSSB-PF). Moreover, we find that an OSSB-PF supports a Pareto-efficient outcome as a stable outcome; if the preference relations are strict, only the Pareto-efficient outcomes are supported by the OSSB-PF.",

keywords = "CSSB, Coalition formation, Coalition-free inducement relations, Invertible inducement relations, OSSB, Perfect foresight",

author = "Yoshio Kamijo",

note = "Funding Information: From Theorem 3, if the preference relations are strict, an outcome is supported by the OSSB-PFs if and only if it is Pareto component-efficient. Thus, the stability and the efficiency are compatible under the assumptions on the invertible and coalition-free inducement relations and the strict preference relations. On the other hand, if the preference relations are not strict, the OSSB-PF supports all the Pareto component-efficient outcomes but it may support the Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Copyright: Copyright 2013 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.",

year = "2013",

month = sep,

doi = "10.1007/s11238-012-9347-y",

language = "English",

volume = "75",

pages = "339--357",

journal = "Theory and Decision",

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T1 - Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation

AU - Kamijo, Yoshio

N1 - Funding Information: From Theorem 3, if the preference relations are strict, an outcome is supported by the OSSB-PFs if and only if it is Pareto component-efficient. Thus, the stability and the efficiency are compatible under the assumptions on the invertible and coalition-free inducement relations and the strict preference relations. On the other hand, if the preference relations are not strict, the OSSB-PF supports all the Pareto component-efficient outcomes but it may support the Pareto-inefficient outcomes. Copyright: Copyright 2013 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.

PY - 2013/9

Y1 - 2013/9

N2 - We study the stable standard of behavior in a perfect foresight situation that was introduced by Xue (Econ Theory 11:603-627, 1998). We assume that the inducement relations are invertible and coalition free. We show that the conditions are sufficient for the existence of the nonempty-valued optimistic/conservative stable standard of behavior for perfect foresight situation (OSSB-PF/CSSB-PF). Moreover, we find that an OSSB-PF supports a Pareto-efficient outcome as a stable outcome; if the preference relations are strict, only the Pareto-efficient outcomes are supported by the OSSB-PF.

AB - We study the stable standard of behavior in a perfect foresight situation that was introduced by Xue (Econ Theory 11:603-627, 1998). We assume that the inducement relations are invertible and coalition free. We show that the conditions are sufficient for the existence of the nonempty-valued optimistic/conservative stable standard of behavior for perfect foresight situation (OSSB-PF/CSSB-PF). Moreover, we find that an OSSB-PF supports a Pareto-efficient outcome as a stable outcome; if the preference relations are strict, only the Pareto-efficient outcomes are supported by the OSSB-PF.

KW - CSSB

KW - Coalition formation

KW - Coalition-free inducement relations

KW - Invertible inducement relations

KW - OSSB

KW - Perfect foresight

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DO - 10.1007/s11238-012-9347-y

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SP - 339

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JO - Theory and Decision

JF - Theory and Decision

IS - 3

ER -

Stability and efficiency in perfect foresight situation

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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