Stable coalition structures under restricted coalitional changes

Yukihiko Funaki, Takehiko Yamato*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper, we examine whether farsighted players form the efficient grand coalition structure in coalition formation games. We propose a stability concept for a coalition structure, called sequentially stability, when only bilateral mergers of two separate coalitions are feasible because of high negotiation costs. We provide an algorithm to check the sequential stability of the grand coalition structure as well as sufficient conditions for which the efficient grand coalition structure is sequentially stable. We also illustrate out results by means of common pool resource games and Cournot oligopoly games.

Original languageEnglish
Article number1450006
JournalInternational Game Theory Review
Issue number3
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Sept


  • Coalition formation
  • Cournot oligopoly
  • common pool resource
  • farsighted players
  • stability

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)
  • Business and International Management
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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