Stable market structures from merger activities in mixed oligopoly with asymmetric costs

Yoshio Kamijo, Yasuhiko Nakamura*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Citations (Scopus)


This paper examines endogenous merger formations in a mixed oligopoly. Applying the core as a solution concept, we analyze which market structure(s) remain(s) stable when three firms-two symmetric private firms and one inefficient public firm-are allowed to merge with each other in a mixed Cournot industry. We show that according to the value of the marginal cost of the public firm, there always exists a pair of share ratios of the owners of both the (pre-merged) public firm and the (pre-merged) private firm such that the market structure with the merger between the public firm and one private firm belongs to the core. When the initial market structure is a mixed triopoly, it can only be blocked when one public firm and one private firm merge. Furthermore, we conduct a similar analysis in a general mixed oligopoly with one public firm and n private firms.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-24
Number of pages24
JournalJournal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2009 Sept


  • Asymmetric cost
  • Core of market structures
  • Merger
  • Mixed oligopoly

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Business,Management and Accounting
  • Economics and Econometrics


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