Strategic Ambiguity with Probabilistic Voting

Yasushi Asako*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


Political parties and candidates usually prefer making ambiguous promises. This study identifies the conditions under which candidates choose ambiguous promises in equilibrium, given convex utility functions of voters. The results show that in a deterministic model, no equilibrium exists when voters have convex utility functions. However, in a probabilistic voting model, candidates make ambiguous promises in equilibrium when (i) voters have convex utility functions, and (ii) the distribution of voters’ most preferred policies is polarized. JEL Classification: D71, D72.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)626-641
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Theoretical Politics
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Oct 1


  • Campaign platform
  • Elections
  • Polarization
  • Political ambiguity
  • Probabilistic voting
  • Public promise

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science


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