TY - GEN
T1 - Strategic bidding of private information for principal-agent type dynamic LQ networks
AU - Wasa, Yasuaki
AU - Murao, Toshiyuki
AU - Tanaka, Takashi
AU - Uchida, Kenko
N1 - Funding Information:
Y. Wasa and K. Uchida are with the Department of Electrical Engineering and Bioscience, Waseda University, Tokyo 169-8555, JAPAN. T. Murao is with the Department of Robotics, Kanazawa Institute of Technology, Ishikawa 921-8501 JAPAN. T. Takana is with the Department of Aerospace Engineering and Engineering Mechanics, The University of Texas at Austin, Texas 78712, USA. wasa@aoni.waseda.jp, murao@neptune.kanazawa-it.ac.jp, ttanaka@utexas.edu, kuchida@waseda.jp. This work was supported by JST CREST Grant Number JPMJCR15K2.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 EUCA.
PY - 2019/6
Y1 - 2019/6
N2 - In this paper, focusing on agents' strategic behavior in their private information utilization, we formulate two types of strategic bidding problems for a simple dynamic principal-agent type linear quadratic (LQ) network where a principal integrates agents' individual controls into the socially optimal one based on information bid by the agents. One is the case that all the agents minimize their own cost, which is undesirable for the principal. The other is an equilibrium in the presence of the incentive design motivated by the standard contract theory to reduce the wasteful social cost. Then we analytically derive optimal designs of strategic bidding for each type and discuss their implications and implementations.
AB - In this paper, focusing on agents' strategic behavior in their private information utilization, we formulate two types of strategic bidding problems for a simple dynamic principal-agent type linear quadratic (LQ) network where a principal integrates agents' individual controls into the socially optimal one based on information bid by the agents. One is the case that all the agents minimize their own cost, which is undesirable for the principal. The other is an equilibrium in the presence of the incentive design motivated by the standard contract theory to reduce the wasteful social cost. Then we analytically derive optimal designs of strategic bidding for each type and discuss their implications and implementations.
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U2 - 10.23919/ECC.2019.8796002
DO - 10.23919/ECC.2019.8796002
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85071601257
T3 - 2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019
SP - 3383
EP - 3389
BT - 2019 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 18th European Control Conference, ECC 2019
Y2 - 25 June 2019 through 28 June 2019
ER -