Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions

Y. Kamijo*, T. Nihonsugi, A. Takeuchi, Y. Funaki

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

19 Citations (Scopus)


This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)180-195
Number of pages16
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Publication statusPublished - 2014 Mar


  • Laboratory experiment
  • Linear public goods game
  • Punishment institutions
  • Sanction

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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