Tax competition in federations revisited

Jiancai Pi; Yu Zhou

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.024

Tax competition in federations revisited

Jiancai Pi, Yu Zhou^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We extend Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2004) by considering all-purpose public goods that are beneficial to both producers and consumers. Horizontal externality (resp. vertical externality) exerted by tax competition will not necessarily lead to inefficient outcomes.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	104-107
Number of pages	4
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	123
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.024
Publication status	Published - 2014 Apr 1
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Horizontal externality
Public goods provision
Vertical externality
Vertical tax competition

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.024

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title = "Tax competition in federations revisited",

abstract = "We extend Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2004) by considering all-purpose public goods that are beneficial to both producers and consumers. Horizontal externality (resp. vertical externality) exerted by tax competition will not necessarily lead to inefficient outcomes.",

keywords = "Horizontal externality, Public goods provision, Vertical externality, Vertical tax competition",

author = "Jiancai Pi and Yu Zhou",

year = "2014",

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doi = "10.1016/j.econlet.2014.01.024",

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KW - Vertical externality

KW - Vertical tax competition

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Tax competition in federations revisited

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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